11 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Security

FROM: [   ]   STAT

                    Chief, SECOM

SUBJECT: Compartmentation Revision

　　1. As the Director of CIA, Office of Security, you might consider the following points in advising the CIA member NFIB on the proposed revision of compartmentation programs. This is not a coordinated OS position.

　　2. <u>General</u>: We should support a revision of the compartmentation programs. [   ] work represents   STAT
a more viable concept than does [   ]   STAT

　　3. <u>Problems</u>: a. Whether or not serious commitments will be made by departments and agencies is a problem. It is essential to the concept that a serious effort be made to remove as much material as possible from our current compartmented programs. It is also imperative that need-to-know be highly exercised least we see the entire Intelligence Community approved for access.

　　　　b. Considerable effort by the security elements in all NFIB Agencies will be necessary. They should be instructed and briefed in detail of what is expected of them or else unnecessary implementation problems will arise.

　　　　c. The Security Committee is not currently structured to adopt an oversight role in the implementation of the currently proposed revision.

　　　　d. The [   ] system will not satisfy   STAT
the envisioned need to implement this proposal. We should examine the potential use of the 4-C concept.

e.   Compartmentation of HUMINT will require some agencies such as State Department to incur new costs in order to comply the existing communities physical security requirements for compartmentation. This might also be true of some of the military elements.

f.   Concern should be expressed from the security view point of the increased volumn of formally compartmented material which will now be potentially available to all holders of Secret and Top Secret clearances.

4.   In addition to the above, there may be required some adjustment in CIA's view of security. The Community already objects to some of CIA's tight physical security requirements. Lastly, the four-month time frame to prepare for implementation might be cutting it very thin. The actual implementation phase scheduled to begin in May/June 1979 will take considerable time and will impose unbudgeted requirements on participating agencies.

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